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Nationalism is frequently considered as an extreme, ‘hot’ phenomenon related to often violent nation/
state-building processes. Billig’s Banal Nationalism turned the attention to how nationalism is also
‘ﬂagged’ and routinely reproduced in existing states. This article studies the mobilization of these forms
of nationalism and suggests that independence is a useful notion in bridging the hot/banal divide and for
tracing the ‘hot in the banal’. Whereas for separatist movements independence is primarily a goal aspired
to, in existing states independence/sovereignty is used to bring together hot and banal forms of
nationalism which are mobilized in reproducing the discourses/practices related to the purported na-
tional identity. This paper ﬁrst outlines a heuristic framework for conceptualizing independence and its
key dimensions in relation to hot and banal nationalism as well as state-territory building. Secondly, the
paper will study empirically the merit of the notion of independence regarding nationalism research via
four themes: (1) the role of independence in Finland’s state/nation-building process, spatial socialization
and in mixing hot and banal nationalism; (2) the use of the ‘independence card’ by (nationalist) parties;
(3) the mobilization of nationalist practices/discourses in the performativity of Finnish Independence
Day; and (4) the resistance that the independence celebrations have incited. This study shows that the
idea of independence in this context is inward-looking, draws on Othering, and is ﬂagged in media and
spatial socialization (e.g. education) using particular iconographies, landscapes, events, and memories
related above all to wars. Rather than expressing hot or banal nationalism these discourses/practices
effectively merge the two, challenging any simple dichotomy between them. The performativity of In-
dependence Day in particular displays this blending.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
It is a dark winter evening in Finland, the 6th of December. At 6
p.m. countless citizens light two candles in their windows e a
traditional Finnish symbol for national independence. It is a
national holiday and television has been broadcasting patriotic
programming since the morning: a Lutheran service, military
music and a parade, documentaries and movies related to his-
torical events, wars and ordinary life. Now, over two million
spectators, almost half of the nation, have gathered around
televisions to watch an event that occurs in a festive Empire
style house, the Presidential Residence in Helsinki. Suddenly a
military band starts playing Jean Sibelius’ Jaegar March and anUniversity of Oulu, Finland.
Ltd. This is an open access articlealmost endless queue of people quietly ﬁles into the hall. Over
the next few hours men dressed in festive tailcoats, women in
colorful evening dresses, move slowly and silently through the
decorated hall. Each person stops for a moment to wish the
Presidential couple a happy Independence Day, thus contrib-
uting to “the world’s longest hand-shaking TV program” (cf.
Kivioja, 2012). Later reporters interview guests, who praise
Finland’s independence. Earlier the same day, volunteers have
arranged an outdoor ‘Independence Day Gala’ for the poor and
homeless, distributing free meals. During the evening party,
protestors demonstrate outside of the Presidential Residence,
resisting riot police. They demand equal rights for the poor, and
oppose the elites’ partying and the power of capital in the EU.
For major populist political parties, EU membership in 1995
practically signiﬁed the end of Finland’s existence as an inde-
pendent state.under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
A. Paasi / Political Geography 54 (2016) 21e3122International law recognizes political independence as a con-
dition where a sovereign state exercises territorial integrity over its
bounded territory. Due to this fact, independence is often under-
stood as inward-looking, territorial and set. However, as the dozens
of independence movements around the world demonstrate,
nation-statehood is not an unchanging given but evolves both in-
side and across existing territorial borders. Palestine and Kurdistan
provide perhaps the most enduring examples but several political
movements around Europe make e at times peacefully, at times
violently e claims for independence (e.g. the Basque Country,
‘Padania’, Corsica, Veneto, Wales). In Scotland and Catalonia refer-
endums on independence were organized in 2014. In the former,
44.7 percent of voters said yes, in the latter 80 percent (though the
voter turnout in Catalonia was only 35 percent). In the UK, the
political elite monitored the referendum with anxiety (Sharp,
Cumbers, Painter, & Wood, 2014); in Spain the government
declared the ballot illegal (unconstitutional), so the issue was
effectively little more than an opinion survey. The idea of inde-
pendence has also gained political signiﬁcance in exclusionist po-
litical programs and even in the names of right wing parties that
resist the EU and rely on anti-immigrant rhetoric and imagery (e.g.
UK, Greece, Finland).
However, independence is much more than the legal aspects
related to sovereignty, as the generalized vignette on the Finnish
Independence Gala described above shows. It is also a social pro-
cess and set of practices/discourses that bring together an actual (or
aspired) sovereignty, the history of a territory, as well as a selection
of routinized habits, events, memories and also narratives and
iconographies related to the purported national identity. Inde-
pendence thus also encompasses national symbols, meanings,
collective memory and the everyday. It is a contestable and com-
plex, emotionally laden idea/ideal that can be mobilized in con-
tradictory ways.
The above examples allude to the fact that the nation is usually
seen as a ‘natural’ unit and independence as its apex. The notion of
independence is therefore closely related to nationalism. Michael
Billig’s (1995) work has been particularly inspiring for reﬂecting on
the multiple dimensions of nationalism and he also provides some
preliminary ideas on the link between nationalism and indepen-
dence. He argues that much of nationalism research has focused on
extraordinary or ‘hot’ nationalism, the often violent struggle to-
ward autonomy, unity and independence, and that researchers
have tended to ignore how nationalism is maintained once inde-
pendence has been achieved. He coined the term banal nationalism
to illustrate the reproduction of nationalism in existing states, and
noted how national identities become “a form of life which is daily
lived in a world of nation-states” (p. 68).
Independence is typically celebrated (‘Independence Day’) in
states that have ceased to be part of another entity as a result of
empires or colonial dependence collapsing or military occupation
ending. Since the 19th century many ‘successful’ nationalisms have
effected the disintegration of existing states, that is, independence
has emerged from separation or liberation nationalism (Taylor,
1993, pp. 204e205). Respectively, independence-related national
days are common in the Americas, Africa, Asia and Eastern/Central
Europe. Conversely, many old European core states celebrate na-
tional days that are associated with events or persons rather than
independence. Some states like the UK do not have a formal na-
tional/independence day, though there have been recent proposals
to initiate a British National Day. While independence and national
days may provide temporary fuel for banal nationalism, Billig
(1995) accentuates the greater importance of routinized ‘ﬂagging’,
in weather reports, sports journalism or in the words of politicians
(‘we’/‘us’) for example, which continually reminds citizens of their
nationhood.Billig’s ideas have raised much discussion and political geogra-
phers, among others, have challenged the strict distinction be-
tween hot and banal nationalism. Jones and Merriman (2009), for
example, studied the campaign in favor of bilingual road signs in
Wales and proposed the notion of ‘everyday nationalism’ which
sees banal and hot elements as merged rather than separate.
Benwell (2014, cf. Benwell and Dodds, 2011), for his part, argued
that scholars should look at more blatant expressions and contexts
of nationalism, such as education in school classrooms. His obser-
vations from Argentina and the Falkland Islands showed that ex-
pressions of nationalism in education were far from banal: young
people were deliberately inculcated with narratives essential to
national identity.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on hot/banal
nationalism by adjusting the focus onto the notion of indepen-
dence. While Billig (1995) noted in passing that independence is
important not only for hot nationalist struggles but also for banal
nationalism, he did not develop this idea further but took inde-
pendence largely for granted. This article argues that independence
is a useful notion for understanding the interplay between hot and
banal as well as for tracing the ‘hot in the banal’. My argument is
that independence is e particularly in existing sovereign states e a
crucial ideological medium that combines these nationalism forms
(in politics, culture and media) in routinized and latent but also at
times in very salient ways. Independence brings together material
processes (e.g. construction and naturalization of national and
military landscapes, symbols and maps) and events (e.g. indepen-
dence/national days, ﬂag days, commemorations of national
‘heroes’) that fuse various spatial and historical scales. It is thus a
pivotal aspect of ‘national meta-narratives’ that deﬁne the key el-
ements of the purported national identity (Morrissey, 2014) and
conditions the subjectiﬁcation and consent of citizens as re-
producers of such narratives. Independence is hence a useful meta-
level concept to expose the complexity and dynamism of nation-
alism and the institutional settings and events where nationalism
occurs. From this angle, banal nationalism is not only something
related to the daily ﬂagging of the nation, and hot nationalism not
just something extraordinary that predates this cooler stage.
Rather, when entangled together e in certain national(ist) actions
related to the everyday, memories, and ideologies and material
landscapes related to war, loss and suffering, for example e these
nationalisms become fused in such way that hot nationalism may
be the critical catalyst for banal nationalism (cf. Benwell & Dodds,
2011). This conﬂuence is mediated by institutions such as media
and education but also by temporary but recurring performances in
which the (meta-)theme of independence plays no small part.
Political historians and IR scholars have long seen independence
as an important concept (Armitage, 2004; Dumbauld, 1976;
Fromkin, 1981; Linklater, 1998; Schulze, 1994; Woolf, 1996). Polit-
ical geographers have paid less e especially theoretical e attention
to this notion and instead have theorized concepts such as sover-
eignty, state/nation, territory, border, national identity, and war
(Agnew, 2009; Herb & Kaplan, 1999; Knight, 1982; Mellor, 1989;
Murphy, 2013; Shaudys, 1962). Though absent from the key con-
ceptual debates, independence has nevertheless inspired some
political geographers since World War II, especially in the context
of post-colonialism, border studies and sovereignty transfer
(Kasperson & Minghi, 1970; Shaudys, 1962; Spykman, 1942). Po-
litical independence/sovereignty is inherent, for instance, in
Hartshorne’s (1950) famous ‘state idea’ and his ‘centripetal forces’
that strive to maintain the coherence of a state. Recently, geogra-
phers have noted the role of independence/sovereignty when
studying state-building processes (Jeffrey, 2006; Kuus, 2002;
Mercer, Mohan, & Power, 2003), the power of cartography (Berg
& Oras, 2000; Culcasi, 2006; Jones, 2009; Zeigler, 2002), national
A. Paasi / Political Geography 54 (2016) 21e31 23symbols/iconographies (Brunn, 2000; Hammett, 2014; Penrose,
2011; Raento & Brunn, 2005, 2008), and the rituals/spectacles
related to national celebrations (Kong & Yeoh, 1997; cf. Benwell &
Dodds, 2011).Fig.1. The key dimensions of independence in the wider matrix of territorial institu-
tionalization and geopolitical/geohistorical processes.Research design
In attempting to bridge the debates between hot and banal
nationalism and their relation to the concept of independence, this
article has two major aims. The ﬁrst is to outline a theoret-
icalemethodological framework for conceptualizing the key di-
mensions of independence in the context of nationalism. Instead of
conceptualizing it as a mere territorial condition of international
law, independence is understood here as a wider relational meta-
level category (Fig.1). This approach stresses both the con-
textualeterritorial and wider geopoliticalerelational dimensions of
nation/state-building, pays attention to nationalism in spatial so-
cialization, and e in methodological terms e suggests that the
relationship between hot and banal nationalism should not be
deﬁned ad hoc or ex ante. Instead, it is crucial to scrutinize how
nationalism operates in context (Benwell & Dodds, 2011; Billig,
1995; Jones & Merriman, 2009). Since independence is a medium
that both stimulates and expresses hot and banal forms of
nationalism, the second major aim of this article is to examine the
relationship between independence and nationalism via one con-
crete case, the Finnish state. I will followwhat Sayer (1992) calls an
intensive approach. Respectively, this study is a context-sensitive
and synthetic geo-historical analysis of the key processes, mecha-
nisms, relations, activities, episodes and events related to produc-
tion and reproduction of nationalism in the context of Finnish
independence. It is based on diverse materials including interdis-
ciplinary research literature, participant observation and photos,
school geography textbooks, media texts (newspapers, magazines),
internet comments and political platforms.
The case study comprises four sections. The ﬁrst considers
Finland’s geohistory, nation/nationalism-building and indepen-
dence achievement. Finland is an exciting case due to its geopo-
litical position under the Swedish and Russian regimes for 700
years and subsequent separation (1917), episodes that have
perpetually fed national identity narratives. Further, its relationship
with neighboring Russia has been eternally complex in terms of
geopolitics. Recently, it has been argued that the modern trans-
national world of mobile people, capital, ideas and ideologies has
brought the notion of ﬁxed national identities into question
(Agnew, 2009; Baird, 2014; Skey, 2009). Yet, as we saw above, in the
EUmany nationalist parties perceive the Union and immigration as
threats to identity/independence. The second section therefore
examines the contested ways how Finnish parties and political
elites mobilize independence in their rhetoric. The third section
closely examines the performing of the Finnish Independence Day
festivities and the utilization of particular narratives, events,
monuments and nationalized landscapes to celebrate certain past
struggles and political memories (cf. Baird, 2014; Kong & Yeoh,
1997). The section will trace how hot and banal elements are
used to signify and legitimize independence in national ‘ﬂagging’,
which e through media in particular e literally enters everyday life
and enmeshes ordinary people as participants in hegemonic, ho-
mogenizing national narratives. Similarly to how the ‘loss of inde-
pendence’ in the EU has motivated the rhetoric and resistance of
nationalistic parties, the fourth section examines the street protests
the Independence Day festivities have triggered. These two forms
of protests thus challenge the received notion of ‘Finnish inde-
pendence’ but from very different angles. Finally, some conclusions
will follow.A relational perspective on independence and spatial
socialization
Political independence is often regarded as a ‘substance’, a state
of affairs or a condition that a nation(al territory) has achieved or
should attain. Continual mobilization of national narratives, sym-
bols and nationalist practices is critical since e as Foltz (1963, p.
121) reminds e winning independence is only “the ﬁrst and
perhaps easiest step in building a nation” and “the new state
apparatus must be solidly implanted and extended, and the loyalty
of the people to a stable governing regime, not to an agitational
opposition movement, must be assured.” For Fromkin (1981, p. 15)
political independence is an aspect of freedom that is negative, that
is, “an entity is not ruled by anybody else” and “there is no entity
above it, no political superior, no authority it recognizes and obeys.”
Woolf (1996, p. 1) identiﬁes political independence as a key
element that underlies the ideal of the nation-state together with
the nation as a collective identity and the territory as an areawith a
border demarcating the necessary coincidence between nation and
state (cf. Knight, 1982).
Previous views on independence are inwards-looking and
emphasize the connection between sovereignty, collective identity
and state territory. Such views have been challenged. As Murphy
(2012) suggests, political geographers have moved from “treating
territories as a priori givens to focusing on how political-territorial
structures, practices, and relationships come into being, what
political-territorial arrangements mean or represent, and how they
function in relation to other geographical processes and patterns.”
States have never exercised either total political or economic-
regulatory monopolies over their territory; globalization and
mobility have further complicated the multifaceted relations be-
tween nationalities, territories and sovereignty that are embedded
in wider inter-state arrangements (Agnew, 2009; Berg & Kuusk,
2010; Murphy, 2013). This has encouraged new research on how
we should recognize territories, territoriality and borders in the
current mobile transnational circumstances (Elden, 2009; Murphy,
2013; Paasi, 2012; Sassen, 2013). Territory involves the dimensions
of authority (the state as an instrument of political, legal, police and
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or economic efﬁciency in themanagement of social mechanisms, as
well as identity (Hassner, 1997). The notion of independence pro-
vides a useful meta-level category for understanding the ‘allure of
territory’ (Murphy, 2013) and for problematizing the nationalist
ideal that “there can be no nation without borders; the former
follows from the latter” (Agnew, 2009, p. 67), an ideal that displays
how nationalism is a deeply territorial ideology.
Hence, rather than seeing independence as a ﬁxed territorial
condition of an existing state, a relational perspective helps in
understanding its versatile roles vis-a-vis political action, context
and historical change. It is useful to conceptualize state territory as
a geohistorical process that becomes institutionalized e often dis-
playing separation from a wider territory e and may eventually
lead to recognition, sovereignty, and independence (Paasi, 1996;
Fig.1). Independence thus typically reﬂects the wider geopolitical/
economic relations, contradictory political motives, ideas/ideals
and mobilizations of a territory. Recognizing wider geohistories,
networks and interactions are critical in order to avoid falling on a
‘territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994). Territorial and relational elements
are hence inseparable constituents in the making of a territory and
in generating imagined national(ist) spaces. Relational processes
may ‘stretch’ the formal territory beyond its ostensibly stable bor-
ders and indeed be constitutive of such ﬂexible borders (cf. Sassen,
2013). Borders are thus not merely lines located at the edges of
territories but e as part of the symbolic and technological land-
scapes of social control (Paasi, 2012) e borders can be situated
functionally, symbolically and ideologically in a variety of locations,
networks, even outside of the state territory (e.g. ‘national’ military
cemeteries located abroad, internationalized border guard sys-
tems) and yet nonetheless be crucial in making state territory/in-
dependence meaningful.
Fig.1 heuristically brings together some categories and pro-
cesses that are vital in the making and representing of independent
territories. It also suggests that hot and banal nationalism are
meaningful socio-spatial categories only within a wider matrix of
concepts/discourses and social practices. Mapping and the pro-
duction of territorial knowledge are key processes in the produc-
tion of territories and in making them meaningful (H€akli, 2001;
Kaplan & Herb, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Paasi, 1996; Zeigler, 2002).
Nationality and citizenship, for their part, are crucial mediating
formal and emotional categories that bring together the state, ter-
ritory, forms of nationalism and independence (cf. Smith, 1979;
Miller, 1995). The state ultimately decides how citizenship can be
acquired and lost.
As regards internalizing collective identities and ‘national’ po-
litical subjectivities, people are not passive marionettes. Such
internalization and national consent draw on interactions, practices
and struggles in daily life where wider social institutions are faced,
produced/reproduced and contested (Jones & Merriman, 2009).
While multiculturalism and transnationalism are increasingly sig-
niﬁcant in education e often with the aim of educating neoliberal
citizen-subjects capable of surviving in the global economy
(Mitchell, 2003) e it is important to note that nationalism remains
a prominent aspect of education and textbooks (cf. Benwell, 2014;
Herb, 2004; Paasi, 1999a; Schleicher, 1993). Hence nationalism is
embedded in spatial socialization, the process through which actors
become members of territorial entities and internalize narratives
and memories related to collective identities and shared traditions
(Paasi, 1996, p. 8). Spatial socialization modiﬁes citizens’ sub-
jectivities and consent, often obscuring power relations within ‘us’
and multiple forms of oppression and privilege (Benwell, 2014;
Billig, 1995; Paasi, 1999a; Zhao, 2014).
Socializing institutions function in the ﬁeld of symbolic econ-
omy, i.e. in the exchange of symbolic goods and gifts (Bourdieu,1998). Such exchange refers to a speciﬁc deference, a social rela-
tion that converts power relations into moral ones (Paasi, 1996).
People identify themselves with collective institutions only if they
feel that they also beneﬁt from symbolic exchange. Such beneﬁts
may include ontological security or sense of communal belonging
but alsomorematerial elements (e.g. social and economic security).
As Rosenau (1997, p. 220) has stated, “to the extent that people have
a need for a community and a sense of independence, then to that
extent the achievement and maintenance of sovereignty for their
nation [serves] important human longings.” It is clear that symbolic
exchange is related to symbolic violence, the use of soft and
invisible forms of power. The key medium for such exchange is
language. Bourdieu (1999) in particular has stressed the instru-
mental power of words to produce things, to create collective
fancies, fears, phobias or simply distorted images. Writing and
talking about identities, or performing historical events through
which identities are understood, literally brings them into being.
Through language and performance representations thus become
constituents of identity.
The institutionalization of Finnish territory, independence
and nationalism
Finland is a ﬁtting example of separation nationalism (cf. Taylor,
1993). Actually a set of provinces, the land was under the fealty of
Sweden for 600 years before becoming an autonomous, ‘internally
independent’ territory within the Russian Empire, with a senate,
school system, economy, currency and stamps, for example. The
autonomous state was created in 1809, but economic integration,
culturalepolitical awakening and the creation of the mechanisms
of spatial socialization occurred only after the mid-19th century.
Finland attained political independence in 1917. The consolidation
of the state and nationalism was linked with the rise of industrial
capitalism, which the state promoted through infrastructure in-
vestments (e.g. canals, railways). This contributed to economic
integration, mobility of labor and more effective communication
(Moisio & Paasi, 2013). During the 19th and early 20th century,
Finnish nationalism gradually developed from cultural and lin-
guistic forms toward (contested) claims for full political indepen-
dence, a process that was supported by the already existing
territorial shape of the state (H€akli, 1999; Paasi, 1990, 1996). The
gradual construction of borders, national iconographies and in-
stitutions as well as achieving and maintaining independence
therefore display a complex geo-history linked to a wider geopo-
litical environment.
Schulze (1994, p. 110) observes that small nations often discover
their ‘national identity’ in the struggle for their independence. In
such struggles the mobilization of memory is crucial. As a small
state with only 5.4 million inhabitants today, the narratives of
Finland’s national identity have, for the last 100 hundred years or
so, been based on certain formative events and collective mem-
ories. These have been maintained by various social institutions
through elements that draw on material culture, folklore, stereo-
types and the images of an ostensibly ‘Finnish national landscape’
dominated by nature (Jokela & Linkola, 2013; Paasi, 2008). Media
and routine symbols and language are crucial in the making of
national identities (Schlesinger, 1991).
If language was crucial to Bourdieu, also Billig (1995, p. 61) ac-
centuates the role of language in ﬂagging national identity: one
should not ask “What is national identity?” but rather “What does it
mean to claim to have a national identity?”Oneway to answer such
a question is to consider whose and what kinds of plots charac-
terize the narratives through which independence and the pur-
ported national identity is told. Intellectuals are crucial in shaping
both hegemonic national memories and forms of amnesia, and the
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historians regularly highlight cultural institutions (the Kalevala
epic, Finnish language and literature, folk/classical music and art)
(Reitala, 1983) and key national culturalepolitical actors
(Wuorinen, 1935), while political historians stress political actors
and processes, periods of crisis and how the state has overcome
them (Jussila, Hentil€a, & Nevakivi, 2009). The success of Finnish
athletes in early Olympic games was presented as evidence of the
vitality of the new state: Finland was literally ‘run on the map’
(Tervo, 2003). This sport-related national narrative is still crucial.
Despite such competing, inevitably biased partial narratives,
geopolitical action persistently focuses on deﬁning territories and
their boundaries at various scales, and contestation over these is
critical in the signiﬁcation of social world and order (Harle &
Moisio, 2000). War and secessionist activism classically serve as
mediums for such contests and as catalysts for independence
movements (Blacksell, 2006). Nationalism and war are thus closely
linked (Conversi, 2008) and national security is one of the
ideological-material cornerstones of state independence (cf. Kuus,
2002). Military infrastructures and conscript armies in particular
have been crucial since they distribute state power and ideologies
throughout the national territory and create consent (cf. Koch,
2011). Conscription is a key mechanism of spatial socialization in
Finland as well, and the army is perennially a respected institution.
About 70 percent of male cohorts perform military service. The
ideologicalevisual aesthetic of themilitary effectively fuses hot and
banal elements of nationalism. A ﬁtting example is swearing the
military oath, a festive family event where hot (memories of/
preparation for war) and banal forms of nationalism (symbolism,
ﬂagging) come together (Fig. 2). The rhetoric of the mandatory
military oath also reveals the link between war, sacriﬁce andFig. 2. Combining hot and banal nationalism into a family affair: the military oath at a
Finnish military base (photo by the author).religion (Paasi, 1999b).
It is often suggested that the Winter War with the Soviet Union
(1939e1940) had a profound impact on the Finnish geo-historical
consciousness, bringing into identity and independence narra-
tives a very ‘hot’ element that tends to homogenize the store of
national, collective experiences (Paasi, 1996). Harle and Moisio
(2000) note that Finland’s national identity politics has complex
roots embedded in the relations between Sweden, Finland and
Russia, but also that national independence in 1917 and the ﬁxing of
state borders gave a new meaning to such politics by bringing the
land and national territory together.
Violence, wars, and the threat represented by Russia/the Soviet
Union have in general been critical in shaping national narratives
related to independence. Similarly, the politico-ideological border
with Russia has been at the core of the narration of national identity
since 1917 and even earlier. The Finnish state as a national ‘We’ has
typically been constructed in exclusive terms in relation to Russia/
the Soviet Union (‘The Other’). The memories of World War II are
formative. While Finland preserved its independence, after the war
it had to cede 10 percent of its territory to the Soviet Union and
resettle over 400,000 evacuees. The ceded Karelian area became
highly important for national narratives, heritage and collective
memories (Paasi, 1996), and a sore object of emotional ‘territorial
phantom pains’ for the evacuees (cf. Bille, 2014).
After World War II the political elites struggled to ﬁnd a balance
between the geopolitical west and east, especially as Finland was
required to sign treaties that tied it to the Soviet sphere of interest,
thus shaping the geopolitical context. In some Anglophone
geopolitical maps Finland was simply represented as part of
Eastern Europe (Cohen, 1964, p. 63). Due to the Soviet inﬂuence,
independence became a relative concept in Finland (Meinander,
2003).
Independence narratives, whether representing hot or banal
nationalism, often enter everyday life in the form of small things.
During the early independence period a candle and a miniature
Finnish ﬂag were delivered to the people living in the border re-
gions to remind them of their national identity. Also, the economic
development of border areas was seen as crucial for maintaining
independence (Paasi, 1996). The prosaic omnipresence of national
bank notes, coins and stamps has been important in nation-
building (and resistance) already since the 19th century (Raento
& Brunn, 2005; Raento, H€am€al€ainen, Ikonen, & Mikkonen, 2004).
Also Independence Day anniversaries have had their own
commemorative stamps, depicting scenes from the national Kale-
vala epic, the wars with the Soviet Union, national heroes, and
national landscapes (Raento & Brunn, 2005).
Spatial socialization and independence
Many symbols and narratives related to national identity and
independence have become manifested in spatial socialization. In
Finland, state-centric spatial socialization extends back to the mid-
19th century, to the culturalepolitical work of nationalist activists
who outlined the stereotypic features of the ideal Finn, the
fatherland and the Other. Patriotic literature was an essential part
of the national curriculum, promoting an image of a uniquely
Finnish identity (Salonen, 1970; Wuorinen, 1935). History and ge-
ography as subjects were also mobilized in schools to serve the
nation-building process. Geography textbooks introduced to chil-
dren the Finnish state, its borders, stereotypes of its citizens, and
sometimes racist representations of other nations. School atlases
prepared in the era of autonomy represented the state as a bounded
territory after the mid-19th century, i.e. before independence,
provoking criticism from the Russian authorities (Paasi, 1996). Until
the 1960s, the state was typically labeled in textbooks as the
Fig. 3. A memorial in the Joensuu High School (now an Art Museum) showing the
names of 130 former students who died during World War II. The text tells how “peace
will bless the work and sacriﬁces of generations” (photo by the author).
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female representation for independence that was reproduced in art
but also in more prosaic ways in advertising, for instance.
School geography occupied a powerful position after Finland
gained independence. The 30 Finnish geography textbooks
considered here display this clearly. They demonstrate that chil-
dren were socialized into a rather exclusive national mindset until
the 1980s. The text and landscape photographs both contributed to
the reproduction of nationalism (Jokela & Linkola, 2013; Paasi,
1999a). The following excerpts from school books show the pre-
vailing organistic thinking, normative patriotic narratives of inde-
pendence, the rhetorical fusion of spatial scales from the human
body to the nation, the purported linguistic homogeneousness of
the actually bilingual nation, and an ostensible one-to-one relation
between the citizen and state:
“All people live in societies. Every home is a small society… . A
state is a larger society. We all belong to the Finnish state”
(Jotuni, 1928, p. 14)
“Finland is a living whole, a state individual…. The region sur-
rounded by a border passing over the ground is owned by the
Finnish nation… . The Republic of Finland is thus, as far as its
structure and function are concerned, a gigantic uniform or-
ganism, just as a human being is a uniform organism” (Auer &
Poij€arvi, 1937, p. 12)
“Finland differs from other countries. Our fatherland is Finland.
We are the Finns and we all together form the Finnish nation.
We speak Finnish. The Finnish nation owns Finland. Nation and
country together form the Finnish republic or the State” (Auer &
Merikoski, 1942, p. 21)
“Our fatherland Finland is an independent state. The place that
distinguishes Finland from other states is called the border”
(Hellaakoski, Tuominen,&Mattila, 1954, p. 7, emphasis original)
“We, Finland’s citizens together, have all the power in this
country. We constitute the Finnish state together with our
country. Finland is a republic.” (Myrsky & Ulvinen, 1960, p. 114)
Finland’s borders were labeled as ‘sacred’ in many textbooks,
referring to the home, religion and fatherland axis and implying
that Finland was a ‘chosen nation’ in the religious sense. Religions
and gods have often been recruited in the service of nationalism
(Billig, 1995). DuringWorldWar II, newspapers actively reproduced
such ideas (Paasi, 1996, pp. 194e195) and during the Continuation
War (1941e44) even military priests were committed to national-
istic ideas of a holy war against Bolshevism (Tilli, 2014). After the
war the content of the books was ‘neutralized’, again reﬂecting the
changing geopolitics. Nevertheless the memories of war and sac-
riﬁce were entrenched in school practices: a number of high
schools have on their walls honorary lists of students that died in
World War II, serving not only as daily reminders of the dire na-
tional past but also effectively melding ‘hot’ and ‘banal’ (Fig. 3).
After entering the EU in 1995 textbooks began to accentuate
Finland’s membership in a wider ‘Nordic’ and European space.
Similarly, international immigration and refugees became a topic in
the books. The national space gradually opened.
The contested geopolitics of ‘independence’ in the
transnational world
Narratives on national identity and geopolitical order are co-
constitutive. While political identities and spaces are often con-
tested and characterized by various forms of resistance (Pile &
Keith, 1997), the performances of nationalism typically entail the
narration of an unambiguous geopolitical order that mirrors the
desired role of the nation-state (Benwell & Dodds, 2011; Dittmer,2013; Dodds, 2000).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the political elite began to
‘reposition’ the Finnish state on the geopolitical WesteEast axis.
Finland’s EU application and membership in 1995 raised a debate
on independence in the new geopolitical context, which political
parties interpreted in dissimilar ways (Paloheimo, 2000). The
‘Westernizers’ supported membership as a means to increase de
facto independence, i.e. to reduce Russia’s potential to interfere in
Finnish politics (known as ‘Finlandization’) which had prevented
‘unquestionable recognition’ by the Western states during the Cold
War period (Moisio, 2006, 2008). Before membership, opponents
argued that Finland would lose its independence if the state
entered the EU, a prediction given by, for example, the Euro-critical
factions of the Christian Party, Central Party, and the Left Alliance
(Paloheimo, 2000). Later, for many critics the change from the
Finnish currency markka to the Euro became a symbol of inde-
pendence lost (Raento et al., 2004).
Independence has become an even more mythical issue now
that the bulk of (trans-)national legislation comes from Brussels.
Particularly the populist political groups have questioned the
dominant, unproblematic view of Finnish independence, even
denying the possibility of political independencewithin the EU. EU-
skepticism often arises from an exclusive nationalistic perspective.
In Nordic countries the ‘threat to national culture’ has been among
the key motives of far right parties, whereas in many other Euro-
pean states motives are often related to anti-immigrant attitudes,
Islamophobia or economic recession (The Economist, 2012). Some
fringe Finnish political groups, such as the Independence Party,
emphasize the value of national ‘self-reliance’ and advocate the
abolition of the Euro currency. The Independence Party has no real
political power, but The Finns, by contrast, have 38 members out of
Finland’s total 200 MPs. The Finns is a conservative, Christian social
and EU-skeptical party that emphasizes the importance of inde-
pendence and claims that humankind is ‘naturally’ divided into
different cultures. Consequently, they are vigorous supporters of
independent national states and Finnish culture: “only a nation that
constitutes a nationhood that is separate from other nations, has an
eternal and unlimited right to decide freely and independently of
all own matters” (Perussuomalaiset, 2014). Nationalist thinking
often associates citizenship with independence so that immigra-
tion is seen as a threat to independence. Hence the virtually
transparent bedfellows of these ideas are anti-immigration
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though the party formally rejects racism.
Billig (1995, pp. 101e103) speaks of a ‘patriotic card’ whose
players e e.g. populist right-wingerse claim that only their politics
have the nation’s interest at heart. More than other parties, The
Finns have used the rhetorical ‘independence card’; both inde-
pendence and national self-determination are crucial in the party’s
agenda. Not surprisingly, this card was mobilized in the 2014 Eu-
ropean Parliament elections as well. The party’s EU election coor-
dinator bluntly stated that: “In these elections wewill vote, in effect
no more or less than on the independence of Finland. Do we want
to be an independent state or a part of a federal state, the carrier of
the burden of other member states?” (Sinisalo, 2014). Indepen-
dence was thus mobilized as a vehicle of national exclusion.
Some other parties also commented on independence in the
context of the EU elections but did not see EU membership as a
‘threat’. For the Central Party (2014), the EU was an “association of
independent states.” The key aim of The National Coalition Party
(2014), for its part, was to “safeguard the independence of the
state, to develop European cooperation and to strengthen Finland’s
inﬂuence and position in the world.”
During the recent economic recession, nationalist, anti-
immigration attitudes have gained support in elections in Finland
and other European states. The EU elections in 2014 witnessed the
victory of EU-critical and anti-immigrant parties, and in the UK and
France the EU-critical parties became the largest parties. In Finland
the winner was the National Coalition Party and The Finns were not
able to repeat the success of previous parliamentary elections, yet
they received 13 percent of the vote. Since the municipal elections
of 2008, The Finns’ immigration critique has been echoed by some
other parties, which has led to the strengthening of the idea of a
more exclusive national identity (Koivulaakso, Brunila, &
Andersson, 2012). And yet, the amount of Finnish citizens born
abroad is only 5.2%.The performativity of Independence Day in Finland
Again, during this Independence Day, at 6 pm, The Finlandia
Hymn of Jean Sibelius echoes from millions of radios and tele-
visions. Though spectacularly mundane, it still articulates the
words to those stiﬂed feelings that were recorded into the
memory of our nation during the years of war and during the
decades of restoration that followed them. May the hymn bring
clemency, consolation and light in the minds of all of
us… (Angeria, 2012)
Independence and national days are typically emotionally laden
‘summaries’ and performances of claimed national identity, sym-
bolisms and material practices. Political elites play the key roles in
conducting the rites, but the real signiﬁcance of such events with
respect to reproducing nationalism is related to the practices and
discourses through which ‘independence’ is brought into daily lives
and made meaningful. The media are in a key position in such
mediation, thus disclosing another major agent of national social-
ization besides education.
Various context-bound signiﬁers related to independence affect
its banal manifestation in daily life (cf. Benwell & Dodds, 2011;
Coles, 2002; Henry & Berg, 2006; Jones & Merriman, 2009). Mak-
ing independence meaningful is a process of performativity, that is,
“the reiterative and citational practice bywhich discourse produces
the effects that it names”; it is a “regulated process of repetition”
(Butler, 1993, p. 2). Such reiteration reveals itself in concrete ﬂag-
ging but also in daily and annual rhythms (e.g. national holidays), in
the utilization of national iconographies and in the rhetoric offestive speeches given by various actors. Finland has seven annual
ﬂag days when state ofﬁces and institutions are required to ﬂy the
ﬂag. Independence Day is one of the ofﬁcial ﬂag days and as the
national holiday it provides the background for other events. There
are also 13 days when ﬂagging is recommended by the state. Eight
ﬂag days are related to Finnish culture and to the historical key
ﬁgures or ‘identity-makers’ in the realms of literature, music and
poetry. The Finnish Defense Forces, veterans and the war dead, too,
have their own ﬂag days, often accompanied by patriotic national-
wide programs. Ofﬁcial linguistic minorities have their own unique
ﬂag days, too.
Waving the national ﬂag is not an everyday thing in Finland but
any Finn can raise the ﬂag on special occasions (e.g. birthdays or
other family events). Ofﬁcial ﬂag days provide the nationwith a sort
of annual nationalistic cyclical rhythm that perpetually reproduces
political memories related to various hot and banal nationalist
events and episodes that animate the idea of independence. This
cyclical rhythm is entangled with a linear timeline (cf. Dittmer,
2013) that witnesses the ‘aging’ of the state and gives a further
booster to anniversaries, which are often symbolized by special
stamps (probably next in 2017 when the state will celebrate 100
years of independence). Both rhythms are embedded in the wider
geopolitical background.
The previous sections conﬁrm Billig’s (1995) argument that to
create narratives of national identity is to possess ways of talking
about nationhood. Yet much of national discourse is simultaneously
embedded in material political landscapes (national buildings,
cemeteries, monuments) (Johnson, 1995; Morrissey, 2014) and in
practices, events and rituals, such as military processions and other
parades. The latter reproduce memories and identity/indepen-
dence narratives by re-enacting landscapes or ‘deathscapes’ (cf.
Maddrell & Sidaway, 2010; Fig. 4). In such performances hot
nationalism effectively merges with banal and institutes a culture
of memorializing that serves to preserve and forge collective
memory.
Geography comes into play in the sense that the winter season
sets limits to the forms of celebrations, so in Finland Independence
Day (6th December) is thus primarily a media event that draws
people around televisions and patriotic programs related to ‘home,
religion and fatherland’. These include the Lutheran Independence
Day service and a military parade in some Finnish cities, as well as
ﬁlms and documentaries related to attaining independence and
maintaining it after the Winter War (1939e1940) and the Contin-
uation War (1941e1944). Additionally, local patriotic events which
bring together the military, memories of war and religion are
organized around the state (Fig. 4). New war-related monuments
are unremittingly being established (Tuomisto, 1990), which in-
creases ‘symbolic thickness’ and crafts a war-related moral land-
scape that is starkly discernible in the national space and everyday
life. Such widely spread topographies illustrate well that borders
are not mere abstract lines between two states or codes on maps,
but that symbolic bordering is distributed throughout and, at times,
beyond territory (Paasi, 2012).
Dancing on the graves: Independence Day in the Finnish media
‘Dancing on the graves’ in the title of this article comes from a
column written by the pseudonym Siltavahti (‘Bridge guard’)
(Siltavahti, 2010) who noted that the celebration of Finnish Inde-
pendence Day occurs mostly throughmemories related towar. This
not only blends hot into banal ﬂagging, but also provides a largely
military-masculine character in contrast to the female allegories of
the nation such as the Maiden of Finland used as the symbol of
independence and the ‘purity’ of the nation (Paasi, 1996; Reitala,
1983; cf. Koch, 2011).
Fig. 4. Veterans and the members of voluntary defense force organizations waiting for
the Independence Day speech by the army chaplain in a military cemetery in Oulu city
(photo by the author).
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recognized shared space, together with the newspaper, were the
key vehicles for the emergence of an imagined national community
(Anderson, 1991). Today such media also include television and the
internet, and are more complex in both representing and per-
forming nationalist events. Televisions spread to Finnish house-
holds in the late 1950s. In order to see the changes in the
performance of Independence Day on television, an analysis was
made of the TV broadcasts transmitted on these days in 1960, 1970,
1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. Three themes were noted. The ﬁrst
observation is hardly surprising: (1) many programs are patriotic
and related to national history. However, the second and the third
show that hot nationalism is deeply embedded in banal nationalist
performance: (2) War and the military are crucial in presenting the
national past and their role has increased; (3) the quantity of
patriotic programming has dramatically increased during this
period. In 1960, 1970 and 1980 3e4 hours of patriotic programming
was broadcast, in 1990 nine hours, in 2000 twelve, and in 2010 no
less than 13.5 hours. In 2010, TV channels broadcast more than 12
hours of war-related programming: documentaries on the battles
between Finland and the Soviet Union, military music, parades and
the classic Finnish war movie the Unknown Soldier. This ﬁlm, based
on the best-selling novel by V€ain€o Linna, has been shown on TV
annually since 2000 and before that intermittently. It tells a
detailed, emotional story of the fates of individual soldiers and of
the group dynamics of a machine-gun company during the
Continuation War. This movie has strengthened the imaginaries of
national identity for decades and created mythical ﬁgures for the
national gallery of regional mentalities (Paasi, 1996).
An important feature of national memory is its selectiveness
(Schlesinger, 1991). Henry and Berg (2006, p. 630) speak of the
dialectic of ‘remembering and forgetting’. The Finnish Civil War
between white and red forces that followed the declaration of in-
dependence in 1917 is not part of the dominant identity narrative
performed on television on Independence Day. Rather, the Un-
known Soldier ﬁlm is used to narrate how World War II united the
nation across the former class-based political dividing lines.Fig. 5. Selling Independence Day in the Finnish afternoon press (photo by the author).Hetero-normalizing the nation on TV: the body, food and dance
“The celebration of Finland’s independence has moved from
memorializing the wars to a merry-making that uniﬁes the
nation. The party in the Presidential Residence has an importantrole in this…. The party symbolizes the essence of indepen-
dence…. Even if the nation celebrates in the Residence via its
representatives, people in almost every home participate in the
fest by watching it on television.” (Kaleva, 6.12.2012)
The Independence Day Gala is the most watched program on
Finnish television. The Gala started already in 1919 and the ﬁrst
television broadcast was in 1957. Notably, in 1970 the Indepen-
dence Day broadcast did not include the Gala but instead featured
Soviet cartoons and a Russian language course, perhaps reﬂecting
the Zeitgeist (i.e. Finlandization). Since 1983 the program has been
broadcasted annually. Weeks before the event, the tabloid press
and magazines start to speculate on each year’s invitees, who are
later interviewed and deliver comments on the importance of in-
dependence (Fig. 5). The press reports on the party for several days
and, later, the weekly magazines continue the same storyline. And
the following year, the whole ordeal is repeated again, showing the
power of the ‘reiterative practice’ by which discourse on indepen-
dence produces the ‘effects that it names’. The party is the most
important event of the year for the commercial media: “The af-
ternoon papers have the peak of the year in their selling numbers, a
number of magazines come out earlier to come in for a share of the
spoils, and even the traditional daily newspapers reserve a lot of
space to introduce the costume shine of the party” (Kivioja, 2012).
Varis (2012) argues that along with this commercialization the
nationalist role of the Gala has changed from a rather ofﬁcial, gray
and ceremonial event to a largely visual media-based carnival-
esque. In practice, mourning the sacriﬁces of the wars and a care-
free party are fused.
The plot of the event is simple: the almost 2000 invitees shake
hands with the Presidential couple and then trail into the hall, and
it is quite a trick that this event can be conjured into a media
spectacle that unfailingly attracts a major audience. This must be
due to the symbolic meanings and collective memories related to
this spectacle, which provide people with a sense of sharing in the
national fates, struggles and narratives related to independence.
Television commentators report the event in a lively but respect-
able way. The guests mostly include the political (local politicians,
MPs, ministers) and military elite, representatives from business
life, religion, media, culture (high culture, sport heroes) and uni-
versity circles. War veterans ﬁgure prominently among the guests.
The numerous ordinary citizens that the President has invited bring
to the party an element of the everyday that viewers can share,
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presence of foreign diplomats who thus participate in reproducing
independence. Major elements of the ritual are the interviews
where the invitees volubly express their sentiments on the mean-
ing of independence, not least war veterans who add a touch of ‘hot
memories’. However, not everybody likes the current cheery format
of the Gala: “the key aim of the party cannot be who has bought the
biggest breasts or the longest eyelashes… the key emphasis is on
the wrong issues. Veterans are lying in hospital beds and they
should be remembered.” For others the carnival is ﬁne: “Lately
there has been some debate on the superﬁciality of the party but I
think that it is respectful towards independence to wear one’s best
clothes and to highlight Finnish designers” (Ilta-Sanomat,
7.12.2011).
The power of the party emerges from the predictable order of
things that become a naturalized part of national ﬂagging as well as
of the media narrative. Landscape, food and body are well-known
banal constituents of a nation (Palmer, 1998). Soon after the
welcome ceremony the ‘nation’ starts to enjoy traditional Finnish
cuisine and drinks. This is followed by dancing initiated by the
Presidential couple, a ritual established in 1925. The crowd
squeezes into the hall under the lights needed for TV broadcasting,
providing nourishment for the old plot that the venue is both hot
and cramped. Yet there is plenty of space elsewhere in the resi-
dence and even more when the online broadcast is over and many
guests instantly vanish (Author’s participant observation).
Social space is always a product of social relations. Dancing,
bodily movement can be seen as a gendered social text and as such
also supporting or threatening the existing socio-spatial order and
moral conventions (Cresswell, 2006; Pine & Kuhlke, 2014). The
dancing nation is assumed as being ‘naturally’ hetero-masculine
(Henry & Berg, 2006). Former President Tarja Halonen’s determi-
nation to promote social equity (Tiilikainen, 2010, p. 6) included the
invitation of gay people to the party. While there have long been
gays among Finnish MPs, ministers and candidates in presidential
elections, one particular episode of the Party challenged the given
hetero-masculine norm. The dancing gay couples resisted the
norms of the hetero-masculine national social space and stirred
frantic debates in the media in which dancing e a particular per-
formance of the nation (Nash, 2000)ewas regarded as appropriate
only for hetero couples. This episode was bitter particularly for
some MPs of the nationalistic The Finns Party. The representatives
of the Seta (LGBT Rights in Finland) organization commented that
Finland had moved on to a new era and should be ready to accept
difference (Ranta, 2010).
Glocal protest: the gatecrashers
The nationalist parties’, especially The Finns’ protest discussed
above focused on the potential ‘loss of independence’ in the face of
socio-political and cultural ‘threats’ in the EU (e.g. the loss of leg-
islative power to the EU, immigration), that is, independence was a
rhetorical device for claiming more strictly bounded national(ist)
spaces. The second example of protests related to independence is
an ad hoc series of ‘glocal’ demonstrations organized by activists
that oppose globalization, the state/the market, andwho see the EU
as a medium of the colonizing effects of globalization. Beginning in
the mid-1990s, public protests were organized by heterogeneous
groups of radical activists and anarchists, ‘Gatecrashers’. They
opposed the Independence Day festivities as a manifestation of the
exclusiveness of elitist, political independence.
Several Gatecrashers’ protests have occurred since 1996 and
often their march ended at the Presidential Residence during the
televised party and thus gained considerable media attention. Their
key claims included, for example, a more equal income distribution,better housing possibilities, and a citizens’ Europe instead of a
neoliberal Europe (cf. Hoikkala, 2004). The Gatecrashers’ further
aim was to organize a “borderless revolt against the borderless
elite” (H.S., 2006), to give voice to unemployed and marginalized
people, and to secure a basic income level and basic services for all
citizens. In 1999 the event was inspired by the anti-capitalist pre-
cedents from Seattle, where activists protested the WTO’s neolib-
eral politics on globalization. Although the Gatecrashers were not
an organized social movement, their aims were broadly similar to
those of the later ‘Occupy’ movement that, as Sassen (2013) argues,
represents elementary steps toward making new distinct terri-
tories, transversally bordered spaces not bounded by existing state
territories.
Most Gatecrasher protests were non-violent but there were also
occasional attacks against police. The most intense demonstration
was organized in the city of Tampere (2013), where the Gala was
exceptionally organized because of ongoing restoration of the
Presidential Residence. During the party, protesters struggled with
police outside the venue and broke shop windows; dozens were
arrested. Whether this was an instance of ‘hot internationalism’ or
not, it undoubtedly brought a different sort of ‘hot’ element into the
ordinary ﬂagging of independence. The violent protest raised an
intensive debate in the local newspaper’s (Aamulehti) online sec-
tion, which reveals not only how new media is mediating the
discourse on independence but also how emotionally laden the
festive routines of Independence Day are. An overwhelming ma-
jority of the almost 200 comments opposed the violence and some
characterized the event as the actions of a ‘drunken mob’ that
insulted the ‘traditional order’ of independence festivities. The
comments reveal how the banal understanding of ‘national iden-
tity’ is embedded within powerful ideological structures which
reproduce the given hegemonic relations of inequity that the young
activists challenged (cf. Billig, 1995).
Sick; they should show at least a bit of respect for Finland’s in-
dependence and especially the war veterans. (6.12.2013 19:48)
For shame!!! Every veteran, member of the women’s auxiliary
defense services, and representative of charity organizations has
a right, once a year, to be recognized for their work on behalf of
our independence and society. (6.12.2013 18:19)
For sure the elites must be resisted, but why should this be done
during Independence Day, which is our, everybody’s own Day.
There are 364 other days in a year when you can do it. And did
this drunken gang expect that they can get people on their side?
(6.12.2013 13:46)
Some commentators sympathized with the protesters and
criticized poverty, the ongoing cutting of services, the uneven dis-
tribution of wealth in Finland or nationalism, but many also blamed
EU membership for the ‘disappearance of national independence’.
I fully understand these protesters; the elite is there, eating and
debauching… at tax payers’ expense. This gang partying there
has not done shit on behalf of the independence of Finland, on
the contrary they have given the rest of it to the EU. It is
grotesque that the Finnish ﬂag is still waving on the ﬂagpoles,
and the Coalition Party in the forefront has created a class so-
ciety. (7.12.2013 20:07)
The situation in Finland is unbearable. It is time to rise to the
barricades. This was one reason to start. Hopefully, starting from
now, people will also riot for ‘right things’, like against unem-
ployment, poverty and the rundown of services. (7.12.2013
06:22)
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Regardless of the optimism associated with the end of the Cold
War and the rise of the increasingly relational, transnational world,
it is fair to say that nationalism, exclusion and conﬂicts continue to
characterize the contemporary world. Many ethno-nationalist and
religious movements, whether by peaceful and/or violent means,
struggle toward the goal of an independent state, while the already
independent states eagerly and unendingly remind their citizens of
past conﬂicts and sacriﬁces when reproducing the purported na-
tional identities in discourses, material practices and landscapes.
Territory’s allure (Murphy, 2013) persists even in the transnational
world.
The hot features related to nation-building processes have
formed the core of nationalism research. Michael Billig’s (1995)
idea of banal nationalism redirected research toward the domains
where (and how) nationalism is actually ‘ﬂagged’ and where it
operates silently after unity and independence have been achieved.
He called for systematic research on the ‘taxonomies of ﬂagging’
and on the different genres of banal nationalism, their rhetorical
strategies, and the extent of ﬂagging in various domains and na-
tions. Political geographers later challenged the hot/banal divide
and invited scholars to study the contexts of everyday life to reveal
how actually existing nationalism manifests itself (Benwell &
Dodds, 2011; Jones & Merriman, 2009).
This article has taken seriously both Billig’s proposal and the
criticism of it offered by political geographers. Its key purpose has
been to problematize the hot/banal divide through the prism of
independence, a notion which Billig tends to link with hot rather
than banal nationalism and one which he does not theorize. The
idea of independence and its emotional, nationalist power have
been under-theorized also in political geography. This study shows
that it is a critical meta-level category that comprises not only
various forms of nationalism but also the geohistorical, structur-
alecontextual, and narrative elements embedded in the production
and reproduction of bounded state territories. Independence pro-
vides a contested terrain where ‘the evil’ (nationalism) is often
garbed in the form of a ‘lesser evil’ (patriotism and national
identity).
The case study on the production and reproduction of Finnish
independence demonstrates that once accomplished, (political)
independence is not merely a ﬁxed state of affairs but a dynamic,
contextual, and contestable process that positions the state as part
of the ceaselessly shifting geopolitical landscape and can take on
innumerable local and national, and even contradictory forms in
material landscapes, practices and narratives. This ﬂexible
abstraction is mobilized by the state, political parties, educational
systems, media, NGOs, and organized and ad hoc civil society
movements in their own ways, for their own purposes. This
complexity inevitably takes us beyond the hot and banal nation-
alism divide toward scrutinizing contextually the key sites, material
practices and discourses in which nationalism is produced and
reproduced. Both structural geohistorical and banal forms of
nationalismmust be interrogated through each other. Hot elements
(of nationalism) do not lie buried in history, lurking innocently in
the background behind banal nationalism, but are embedded
within it, thus injecting a critical emotional fuel into banal
nationalism. The inseparability of the ‘structural’ and the ‘everyday’
not only forces us to problematize the various forms of nationalism
but also to recognize the historical contingency of territories and
borders. Despite that independence-related nationalisms tend to
regard them as literally carved in border stones, both territory and
border are ultimately merely temporary processes and manifesta-
tions of social relations in the unending chain of socio-spatial
transformation. This fundamental tension is vividly evident inmany European and non-European states andwill certainly provide
a highly exciting conceptual and empirical terrain for political
geographic research.
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